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In the context of the introduction of the Single Supervisory Mechanism ( SSM) as part 
of the European Banking Union, the European Central Bank ( ECB) has been assigned 
specific supervisory tasks relating to credit institutions established primarily in the 
euro area. One particularly remarkable feature of this new legislation, notably when 
compared with the monetary policy tasks of the ECB, is the introduction of an explicit 
accountability framework with a particular focus on the relationship between the 
ECB and the European Parliament. It is this relationship, and mainly the so-called 
supervisory dialogue, that form the focal point of this contribution, which offers an 
assessment of the legal framework, as well as of the actual practice in these first years 
of the existence of the SSM, against a clearly defined notion of accountability. With 
regard to the actual practice, the contribution focuses on the exchanges between the 
chair of the ECB ’s main decision-preparing body on SSM matters, i.e. the Supervisory 
Board, and the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.
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InTroduCTIon
1  The Banking Union is often described as the single most ambitious European 
integration project since the introduction of the euro.1 It currently consists of 
two pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which has centralised the 
arrangements for the supervision of banks established in those Member States 
that are participating in the Banking Union (currently, only the euro area Member 
States); and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which has centralised deci-
sion-making with respect to the resolution (restructuring) of banks that are failing 
or are likely to fail, thereby avoiding, whenever the public interest so requires, a 
costly and disruptive bankruptcy.2 The “key rationale” for transferring supervisory 
and resolution powers to the EU level, *E.L. Rev. 4
“is to strengthen an unbiased, neutral approach to bank oversight and resolution, 
thus mitigating forbearance and moral hazard, and to break the fatal link between 
sovereigns and their banks.”3
The SSM Regulation, which was adopted on the basis of art.127(6) TFEU, has con-
ferred specific supervisory tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB). The latter is 
currently responsible for the supervision of 119 “significant” banks or cross-border 
groups that are established in euro area Member States,4 “with a focus on protect-
ing the stability of the financial system of the Union”.5 These tasks are listed in the 
SSM Regulation 6 and are carried out by the Supervisory Board, which is an internal 
body of the ECB, rather than a new autonomous agency.7 The national supervi-
sory or competent authorities (NCAs) are in charge of supervising “less significant” 
banks or branches, which number over 3,000.8
One of the (many) remarkable features of the SSM Regulation is the inclusion 
of two provisions directly addressing the accountability of the ECB, and namely its 
Supervisory Board, vis-à-vis the European Parliament (EP or Parliament) and the 
1. For a historical perspective see, e.g., E. Mourlon-Druol, “Banking Union in Historical Perspective: The 
Initiative of the European Commission in the 1960s–1970s” (2016) 54 J.C.M.S. 913.
2. Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L287/63 (SSM Regulation); 
Regulation 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a 
Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L225/1 (SRM Regulation).
3. J. Gordon and W.-G. Ringe, “Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Per-
spective on What It Would Take” (2015) 115 Columbia Law Review 1297, 1306.
4. ECB, “List of Supervised Entities” https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.
list_of_supervised_entities_201812.en.pdf [Accessed 14 January 2019]. See generally A. Pizzolla, 
“The Role of the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism: A New Paradigm for 
EU Governance” (2018) 43 E.L. Rev. 3.
5. SSM Regulation, Preamble, Recital 13.
6. SSM Regulation arts 4, 5 and 9 –18.
7. SSM Regulation art.26(1).
8. SSM Regulation art.6(6).
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national parliaments (NPs) of the Member States that participate in the SSM.9 With 
this a practice is continued and extended that started with the monetary dialogue 
for monetary policy and thereafter found its way into secondary Union law in the 2  
shape of the economic dialogues as part of the Six Pack10 and Two Pack legislation.11
As this supervisory dialogue between the ECB and the EP is a relatively new 
feature, this contribution aims to provide evidence for the effectiveness of this 
mechanism as a means to hold the ECB to account for its conduct in the context 
of the SSM by specifically analysing the interaction between the EP and the ECB, 
which is governed by the SSM Regulation and further specified in the related In-
terinstitutional Agreement between these two Union Institutions.12 Rather than 
to duplicate existing studies offering a more or less descriptive analysis of the 
legal framework and the inter-institutional dynamics involved, this contribution 
will focus on a qualitative assessment of the actual practice in these first years 
of the *E.L. Rev. 5 existence of the supervisory dialogue. In doing so it focuses on 
the exchanges between the chair of the ECB’s main decision-preparing body on 
SSM matters, i.e. the Supervisory Board, and the EP’s Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs. In this context, the notion of “meaningful prudential supervi-
sion dialogue”, referred to in the title of this contribution, is directly linked to the 
notion of accountability. By evaluating the practical modalities and outcomes of 
the interaction between the ECB and the EP in the SSM against an explicit yardstick 
of accountability, tentative conclusions about the value of this procedure as a way 
to hold the ECB to account for the exercise of its prudential supervisory tasks can 
be drawn and, where applicable, recommendations can be made on the ways in 
which this interaction may be improved. Moreover, these findings can be put into 
perspective by looking at previous studies that have undertaken such an exercise 
9. In the first instance, these are euro area Member States. Non-euro area Member States can also par-
ticipate by means of a so-called close co-operation agreement concluded between the ECB and the 
competent national supervisory authority of the Member State concerned: see SSM Regulation art.9.
10. Regulation 1175/2011 amending Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveil-
lance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ 
L306/12; Regulation 1177/2011 amending Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [2011] OJ L306/33; Regulation 1176/2011 on 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L306/25; Directive 2011/85 
on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ L306/41; Regulation 
1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area [2011] OJ L306/1; 
Regulation 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in 
the euro area [2011] OJ L306/8.
11. Regulation 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member 
States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability [2013] OJ L140/1; Regulation 473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring 
and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member 
States in the euro area [2013] OJ L140/11.
12. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank on 
the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exer-
cise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
[2013] OJ L320/1.
Fabian Amtenbrink and Menelaos Markakis 5
ESL
for the pre-existing monetary dialogue between the ECB and the EP and that have 
come up with rather mixed results in terms of the usefulness of this forum in in-
creasing accountability.
The article is structured as follows. The discussion begins with the theoreti-
cal background and broad analytical framework for the study of parliamentary 
hearings as an accountability mechanism. Thereafter, the contribution offers a 
brief overview of the legal framework governing the relationship between the EP 
and the ECB in the framework of the SSM. The penultimate section offers a mostly 
qualitative analysis of the actual exchanges between these two Union institu-
tions. The final section draws some preliminary conclusions on the current state 
of affairs, thereby providing a tentative answer to the question asked in the title 
of this contribution.
on ThE funCTIon of PArLIAMEnTAry hEArIngS AS 
ACCounTABILITy MEChAnISM
From a conceptual point of view, the function of parliamentary hearings in holding 
to account the ECB—or any other body exercising public authority for that mat-
ter—needs to be determined. For this purpose, the somewhat vague term “account-
ability” requires specification. Moreover, the conditions in which parliamentary 
hearings can fulfil an accountability function have to be identified.
As has become clear, namely from an analysis of the SSM Regulation and a 
study of the ever-growing literature on the subject-matter that does not have to 
be reproduced here, the ECB has been given numerous substantial powers not only 
relating to credit institutions under its direct supervision but also relating to the 
oversight over NCAs in the exercise of SSM-related tasks.13 The exercise of those su-
pervisory powers intimately affects, among other fundamental rights, the exercise 
of property rights,14 such that it is argued that the central banks’,
13. For the sake of focus, these powers are not further discussed in this article. See B. Wolfers and T. 
Voland, “Level the Playing Field: The New Supervision of Credit Institutions by the European Central 
Bank” (2014) 51 C.M.L. Rev. 1463; N. Moloney, “European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and 
Resilience” (2014) 51 C.M.L. Rev. 1609; E. Wymeersch, “The Single Supervisory Mechanism or ‘SSM’, 
Part One of the Banking Union”, NBB Working Paper No.255 (2014), available at http://www.nation-
alebankvanbelgie.be/doc/ts/publications/wp/wp255en.pdf [Accessed 19 December 2018]; T. Tröger, 
“The Single Supervisory Mechanism—Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary Assess-
ment of the New Regime for the Prudential Supervision of Banks with ECB Involvement” (2014) 
15 E.B.O.R. 449; G. Schuster, “The Banking Supervisory Competences and Powers of the ECB” (2014) 
EuZW-Beilage 3; J. Gren, D. Howarth and L. Quaglia, “Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe: 
The Construction of a Credible Watchdog” (2015) 53 J.C.M.S. 181; K. Alexander, “The European Central 
Bank and Banking Supervision: The Regulatory Limits of the Single Supervisory Mechanism” (2016) 
24 E.C.F.R. 467.
14. Interestingly, while referring generally to fundamental rights and listing several such rights, the 
Preamble to the SSM Regulation does not explicitly mention the right to property: see Preamble, 
Recital 86.
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“newly fortified powers to oversee and set the terms of trade for banking and other 
parts of finance unambiguously make them part of the ‘regulatory state’. *E.L. Rev. 
6 ”15
To the extent that the European legislator has thus entrusted the ECB with the exer-
cise of public authority, mechanisms must be in place to ensure the back coupling 
to one or more main political institutions, which ensure the democratic legitimacy 
of governance and the observance of the rule of law in the EU.16 As such, the ba-
sic case for the accountability of the ECB for its SSM-related tasks does not differ 
substantially from what has previously been abundantly argued for its monetary 
policy tasks.17 This is particularly the case since the legal basis of the SSM ensures 
the independence of the ECB and the NCAs “in carrying out the tasks conferred 
on it by this Regulation”, whereby the ECB’s Supervisory Board and the steering 
committee must act,
“independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole and … nei-
ther seek nor take instructions from the institutions or bodies of the Union, from 
any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body.”18
With regard to the latter part of this sentence, the SSM Regulation mirrors art.130 
TFEU on the independence of the ECB and the national central banks of the Mem-
ber States.19
15. P. Tucker, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State 
(Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), p.8.
16. The ECB is presently not considered to fall into this narrowly defined category of political institu-
tions. Moreover, the term “political institution” is used here in a narrower sense than that discussed 
in political science research: see, e.g., J. March and J. Olsen, “Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism’” 
in S. Binder, R. Rhodes and B. Rockman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.3–20.
17. See, e.g., J. de Haan and L. Gormley, “The Democratic Deficit of the European Central Bank” (1996) 21 
E.L. Rev. 95; F. Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study of 
the European Central Bank (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999). Generally, making the case for 
the accountability of financial market supervisors, see R. Lastra and H. Shams, “Public Accountability 
in the Financial Sector” in E. Ferrán and C. Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets 
in the 21st Century (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2001), pp.165–188; E. Hüpkes, M. Quintyn and 
M. Taylor, “The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice”, IMF Work-
ing Paper No.51 (2005), available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/
The-Accountability-of-Financial-Sector-Supervisors-Principles-and-Practice-1801 [Accessed 12 
December 2018]; F. Amtenbrink and R. Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial 
Regulatory Agencies—A Theoretical Framework” in R. de Mulder (ed.), Mitigating Risk in the Context 
of Safety and Security: How Relevant is a Rational Approach? (Rotterdam: OMV, 2008), https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/228209991_Securing_Democratic_Accountability_of_Financial_Reg-
ulatory_Agencies_-_A_Theore [Accessed 28 November 2018]. Specifically concerning the ECB in the 
SSM, see G. ter Kuile, L. Wissink and W. Bovenschen, “Tailor-Made Accountability within the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism” (2015) 52 C.M.L. Rev. 155.
18. SSM Regulation art.19.
19. Whether the independence of the ECB for SSM-related tasks also derives from art.130 TFEU and thus 
from primary Union law has been the subject of debate: see, e.g., I. Angeloni, “Rethinking Banking 
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3  At the same time, it has been observed that accountability does not only 
function as a counterbalance to independence, but may actually be supportive of 
the latter, and, moreover, that accountability can be linked to agency performance.20 
With regard to the latter, Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor have observed that: *E.L. Rev. 7
“A properly structured system of accountability lays down rules for subjecting 
the decisions and actions of the agency to review. As such, by reducing the scope 
for ad hoc or discretionary interventions, it potentially enhances the agency’s 
performance.”21
In the light of these considerations, it is little surprising that the importance of 
accountability arrangements for banking supervisors has also been recognised by 
international organisations and standard-setting bodies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlement.22
As has been observed elsewhere, in theoretical terms “accountability” can be 
defined as a concept that stands for the “continuous control of power”, as well as 
“the notion that the accountee takes responsibility for failure and takes steps to 
prevent their recurrence”.23 Arguably, an indispensable part of any meaningful ac-
countability mechanism is that the party to which the accountee has to answer is 
Supervision and the SSM Perspective” (23 April 2015), http://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/
press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150423.en.html [Accessed 28 November 2018]; A. de Gregorio 
Merino, “Institutional Report” in G. Bándi, P. Darák, A. Halustyik and P. Láncos (eds), European Banking 
Union: Congress Proceedings—Vol.1 (Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, 2016); R. Lastra, “Financial Institutions 
and Accountability Mechanisms” in P. Iglesias-Rodríguez (ed.), Building Responsive and Responsible 
Financial Regulators in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2015); 
J.-V. Louis, “Democracy and the European Central Bank: Some Comments on Independence and Ac-
countability” in G. Garzón Clariana (ed.), Democracy in the New Economic Governance of the European 
Union (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2015); T. Tridimas, “General Report” in G. Bándi et al. (eds), European 
Banking Union: Congress Proceedings—Vol.1 (2016).
20. M. Quintyn, S. Ramirez and M. Taylor, “The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and 
Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors”, IMF Working Paper No.25 (2007), available at https://
www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Fear-of-Freedom-Politicians-and-the-
Independence-and-Accountability-of-Fi [Accessed 12 December 2018]; Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor, 
“The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors” (2005).
21. Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor, “The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors” (2005), p.8.
22. See IMF, Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policy, s.VIII; Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Principle No.2.
23. Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory Agencies” in 
Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security (2008), with reference to Hüpkes, Quintyn and 
Taylor, “The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors (2005), p.6. For an overview of different 
concepts of accountability see Ter Kuile, Wissink and Bovenschen, “Tailor-Made Accountability 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism” (2015) 52 C.M.L. Rev. 155, 157–160, with further refer-
ences to relevant literature, including namely M. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: 
A Conceptual Framework” (2007) 13 E.L.J. 447, who offers different classifications of accountability. 
On the application of the principle-agent theory to the ECB see R. Elgie, “The Politics of the European 
Central Bank: Principal-Agent Theory and the Democratic Deficit” (2002) 9 J.E.P.P. 186. Critical on the 
application of the principal-agent theory on independent agencies is G. Majone, “Nonmajoritarian 
Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach” (2001) 
157 J.I.T.E. 57.
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in a position, if needed, to assign consequences to its evaluation of the performance, 
e.g. in the case of bad performance or abuse of power. It is only in the presence of 
the latter power that in multiple principal–agent relationships, as can be observed 
in the case of the delegation of legislative or executive tasks on to independent 
agencies, the party at the helm of the accountability mechanism (principal), e.g. 
the government or parliament, can itself be held to account for the way in which it 
exercises its accountability powers vis-à-vis the independent agency, e.g. by parlia-
ment, the judiciary or the electorate.
From this abstract approach two principal elements of accountability can be 
dissected that provide a basic analytical framework for the evaluation of account-
ability arrangements in the books and in action (de jure and de facto), namely 
preconditions and instruments of accountability.24 If the essence of accountability 
is that the party at the helm of the mechanism can pass an informed judgment on 
the performance of the agent and can assign consequences to this judgment, the 
existence of a sufficiently clear standard based on which the performance can be 
evaluated, as well as the availability of relevant information on the activities of the 
accountee, form two essential preconditions of accountability.
In the absence of clear, predetermined objectives or standards based on which 
the action by the accountee can be assessed, it remains unclear for the latter what 
exactly is expected in terms of performance. Moreover, in such a case any evalua-
tion bears the danger of being aimless or arbitrary. Where the legislator has chosen 
to vest specific public powers in an independent agency, a clear and unequivocal 
yardstick also contributes to shielding the latter from undesirable political influ-
ence. The dangers loom large in the case of vague, very broad or multiple objectives 
without a clear hierarchical order.25 Institutional exchanges, such as parliamentary 
hearings, may in the “best-case” scenario have the character of a general exchange 
of information, without, however, focusing on the question whether the accountee 
has met the predefined objectives or targets, and in the “worst-case” scenario de-
teriorate to a political settling of scores. As a side effect, this also makes any evalu-
ation of the performance of the party at the helm of the accountability *E.L. Rev. 8 
mechanism problematic. As regards financial market regulation and supervision 
in general, it has been observed that they are often characterised not only by the 
pursuit of several objectives, but also by the co-existence of several instruments 
and at times even several agencies.26 What is more, objectives can be formulated 
rather broadly or vaguely, such as financial stability, investor protection, or the 
conduct of business.
24. As developed in Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks (1999), pp.334–380.
25. Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory Agencies” in 
Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security (2008), p.125.
26. Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor, “The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and 
Practice” (2005), p.11; Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regu-
latory Agencies” in Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security (2008), p.125.
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Next to a clear yardstick, transparency forms a crucial precondition for ac-
countability. For monetary and financial policies, transparency has been broadly 
described to entail,
“an environment in which the objectives of policy, its legal, institutional, and eco-
nomic framework, policy decisions and their rationale, data and information re-
lated to monetary and financial policies, and the terms of agencies’ accountability, 
are provided to the public on an understandable, accessible and timely basis.”27
Information thus forms an important, albeit not the only, aspect of transparency, as 
the applicable legal framework predestines the degree of transparency of an agen-
cy to a considerable extent.28 Focusing here on information, this can be provided 
by means of (legally prescribed) reporting requirements through regular publica-
tions, such as monthly, quarterly and annual reports or 4  projections, but can also 
emerge from institutional contacts between the accountee and the party at the 
helm of the accountability mechanism. In this context, it has been observed for the 
national context that contacts with parliament have to be considered “as the most 
important institutional contact for the democratic accountability of the agency”, 
as the latter regularly has the power to change the legal basis of the accountee.29 
While parliament can discuss the performance of the agency on a regular basis, 
the latter can “explain and justify its conduct” not only to democratically elected 
parliamentarians, but—in the case of public hearings—to the public at large.30 It is 
thus hardly surprising that legal arrangements on the appearance of central bank 
officials before parliament are not uncommon around the globe.31 Institutional 
contacts can also exist with the (executive) government, which is of particular 
importance, if government is primarily or in the first line in charge of the account-
ability mechanism.
27. IMF, “Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of Prin-
ciple” (1999), https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/code/ [Accessed 28 November 2018].
28. On the role of transparency see R. Lastra, “How Much Accountability for Central Banks and Supervi-
sors?” (2001) 12 Central Banking 69; F. Amtenbrink, “The Three Pillars of Central Bank Governance: 
Toward a Model Central Bank Law or a Code of Good Governance?” in IMF, Current Developments in 
Monetary and Financial Law, Vol.4 (2005), pp.101–132. Treating accountability and transparency as 
separate concepts are S. Collignon and S. Diessner, “The ECB’s Monetary Dialogue with the European 
Parliament: Efficiency and Accountability during the Euro Crisis?” (2016) 54 J.C.M.S. 1296; D. Curtin, 
“‘Accountable Independence’ of the European Central Bank: Seeing the Logics of Transparency” 
(2017) 23 E.L.J. 28.
29. Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory Agencies” in 
Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security (2008), p.128.
30. Amtenbrink and Lastra, “Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory Agencies” in 
Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security (2008), pp.128–129.
31. See, e.g., the cross-country analysis by D. Stasavage, “Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and 
the Economic Consequences of Monetary Institutions” (2003) 47 A.J.P.S. 389.
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While meaningful accountability is thus arguably impossible in the absence 
of a clear yardstick based on which performance can be evaluated,32 and in the 
absence of meaningful information relating to the achievement of the agency’s 
objectives, this is not to say that the presence of a clear objective and arrangements 
ensuring transparency can in and of itself ensure the accountability of an agency. 
This requires instruments at the disposal of the party at the helm of the account-
ability mechanism to act based *E.L. Rev. 9 on its findings and, where necessary, to 
intervene. Various escalation levels can be differentiated in this regard, ranging 
from the dismissal of agency officials (performance-based dismissal), to the over-
riding of decisions, funding cuts, or amendments to the agency’s legal basis. This 
is in addition to the possibility of judicial review of the action taken by the agency 
and any pecuniary consequences that may result therefrom.
In light of the preceding analysis, parliamentary hearings can in principle fulfil 
an important role in agency accountability. To what extent this is in fact the case 
depends not only on the concrete (legal) arrangements concerning such institu-
tional contacts, the agency’s objective(s) and the applicable transparency arrange-
ments, but more generally on the extent to which parliament has instruments at 
its disposal to assign consequences to its evaluation.
ThE ACCounTABILITy frAMEwork of ThE SSM 
rEguLATIon
Differently from what could previously be observed for the monetary policy 
function of the ECB, the legal basis of the SSM includes several provisions explic-
itly addressing the accountability of the ECB “for the implementation” of the SSM 
Regulation. Focusing presently on the EP, art.20(1) of the SSM Regulation provides 
that “[t]he ECB shall be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Coun-
cil for the implementation of this Regulation”. Interestingly, neither art.20 nor 
any other provision of the SSM Regulation contains a legal definition of the term 
“accountability”.33
Rather, the scope of this term has to be construed from the contents of art.20, as 
well as the Interinstitutional Agreement that has been concluded between the EP 
and the ECB, which complements the SSM Regulation.34 The latter agreement sets 
out the practical modalities for the exercise of what is referred to as “democratic ac-
countability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within 
32. Similarly, Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor, “The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors” (2005), 
pp.10–15.
33. Including, namely, SSM Regulation art.2 on “Definitions”.
34. The conclusion of such an Interinstitutional Agreement is legitimised through secondary Union law, 
namely SSM Regulation art.20(9). Generally, on the legal nature and effects of such agreements in 
European law, see W. Hummer, “From ‘Interinstitutional Agreements’ to ‘Interinstitutional Agen-
cies/Offices’?” (2007) 13 E.L.J. 47.
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the framework of the SSM”.35 Applying the basic analytical framework introduced 
in the previous section of this article, the arrangements relating to preconditions 
of accountability and instruments can be differentiated in the following manner.
Provision of information and institutional contacts
The basic legal obligations introduced by art.20 SSM Regulation are reporting re-
quirements, hearings and ad hoc exchanges, as well as the obligation to respond 
to written questions.36 The ECB is obliged to submit an annual report not only to 
the EP, but also to the Council, the Commission and the Eurogroup. With regard 
to its content, while the SSM Regulation only in very general terms refers to “the 
execution of the *E.L. Rev. 10 tasks conferred on [the ECB] by this Regulation”,37 the 
Interinstitutional Agreement specifies in much greater detail what the annual re-
port must cover, including not only the execution of supervisory tasks, but also for 
instance the sharing of tasks with the NCAs, the co-operation with other national 
or Union relevant authorities, and the separation between monetary policy and 
supervisory tasks.38 The chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board is obliged to present 
the report in public to the EP, whereby the latter receives the report on a confiden-
tial basis four working days in advance of the hearing.39 The Annual Report must 
thereafter also be published on the website of the SSM.
The SSM Regulation and the Interinstitutional Agreement distinguish among 
three types of 5  parliamentary discussions. These are ordinary public hearings; 
ad hoc exchanges of views; and confidential meetings.40 As to the scope of these 
discussions, while in the SSM Regulation reference is made in broad terms to the 
execution of the supervisory tasks, the Interinstitutional Agreement states that “all 
aspects of the activity and functioning of the SSM covered by Regulation (EU) No 
35. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank 
[2013] OJ L320/1.
36. For a neat summary of those powers, see European Parliament, “Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM): Accountability Arrangements and Legal Base for Hearings in the European Parliament: State 
of Play - September 2018” (19 September 2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
ATAG/2017/497742/IPOL_ATA(2017)497742_EN.pdf [Accessed 11 January 2019]. For the powers 
conferred on the Council, Eurogroup and Parliament, see also Louis, “Democracy and the European 
Central Bank” in Democracy in the New Economic Governance of the European Union (2015), especially 
pp.135–145; M. Markakis, “Political and Legal Accountability in the European Banking Union: A First 
Assessment” in M. Szabó, P. Láncos and R. Varga (eds), Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and 
European Law 2016 (The Netherlands: Eleven Publishing, 2017), Ch.32. For a discussion of the powers 
conferred on the EP and national parliaments vis-à-vis the ECB in the fields of monetary policy and 
prudential supervision, see D. Jan#i#, “Accountability of the European Central Bank in a Deepening 
Economic and Monetary Union” in D. Jancic (ed.), National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the 
Euro Crisis: Resilience or Resignation? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp.149–156.
37. SSM Regulation art.20(2).
38. Interinstitutional Agreement s.I.1, p.3.
39. SSM Regulation art.20(3); Interinstitutional Agreement s.I.1, p.3.
40. SSM Regulation art.20(5), (8) and (6).
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1024/2013” can be addressed.41 The Interinstitutional Agreement also determines 
that the chair of the Supervisory Board participates in an ordinary public hearing 
twice a year on request of the EP’s competent committee, which according to the 
Rules of Procedure of the EP is the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
(ECON Committee).42 In addition, the chair of the Supervisory Board can be invited 
to additional ad hoc exchanges of views “on supervisory issues”.43 Furthermore, 
upon request, the chair of the Supervisory Board can schedule confidential oral dis-
cussions behind closed doors with the chair and vice-chairs of the ECON Committee 
in cases “[w]here [it would be] necessary for the exercise of Parliament’s powers 
under the TFEU and Union law”.44 The Interinstitutional Agreement stipulates that 
no minutes or any other recording of the confidential meetings must be taken, and 
that no statement is to be made for the press or any other media. Each participant 
in the confidential discussions must sign every time a solemn declaration not to 
divulge the content of those discussions to any third person.45
Next to regular hearings and ad hoc exchanges, the ECB must reply in writing 
to questions put to it by the EP “as promptly as possible, and in any event within 
five weeks of their transmission to the ECB”. 46 These questions and replies are ac-
cessible on dedicated sections of the ECB and the Parliament’s website.47 The ECB is 
further put under an obligation to co-operate with the EP during any investigations 
carried out by Parliament pursuant to art.226 TFEU on the setting-up of temporary 
committees of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration 
in the implementation of Union law.48
Whereas the SSM Regulation does not include any additional details on this 
point, the Interinstitutional Agreement further contains a number of provisions 
on access to information by Parliament.49 Notably, the ECB must provide the ECON 
Committee at least with a comprehensive and meaningful record of the proceed-
ings of the Supervisory Board that enables an understanding of the discussions, 
including an annotated list of decisions. In the case of an objection of the ECB’s 
Governing Council against a draft *E.L. Rev. 11 decision of the Supervisory Board,50 
the President of the ECB must inform the chair of the ECON Committee of the rea-
41. Interinstitutional Agreement s.I.2, pp.3–4.
42. Interinstitutional Agreement s.I.2, p.3. Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (8th parlia-
mentary term, January 2017), Annex V, s.VI.
43. Interinstitutional Agreement s.I.2, p.3.
44. SSM Regulation art.20(8).
45. Interinstitutional Agreement s.I.2, p.4.
46. SSM Regulation art.20(6); Interinstitutional Agreement s.I.3, p.4.
47. See, e.g., http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/banking-union.html [Accessed 28 
November 2018].
48. Interinstitutional Agreement s.III, pp.5–6.
49. See also SSM Regulation, art.20(9), according to which “appropriate arrangements” have to be con-
cluded between the ECB and the EP on these and other “practical arrangements”.
50. Pursuant to SSM Regulation art.26(8).
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sons for such an objection. In the event of the winding-up of a credit institution, 
non-confidential information relating to that credit institution shall be disclosed 
ex post, once any restrictions on the provision of relevant information resulting 
from confidentiality requirements have ceased to apply.51
The information duties of the ECB also extend to the acts it adopts. According to 
the Interinstitutional Agreement, the ECB must duly inform the ECON Committee 
of the procedures (including timing) it has set up for the adoption of regulations, 
decisions, guidelines and recommendations that are subject to public consultation 
in accordance with the SSM Regulation. The ECB must, in particular, provide infor-
mation on the principles and kinds of indicators of information it is generally using 
in developing acts and policy recommendations, with a view to enhancing trans-
parency and policy consistency. Moreover, the ECB must transmit the draft acts 
before the beginning of the public consultation procedure. Where the EP submits 
comments on the acts, there may be informal exchanges of views with the ECB on 
such comments, in parallel with the open public consultations. Once the ECB has 
adopted an act, it must forward it to the ECON Committee. Last, the ECB is obliged to 
regularly inform the EP in writing about the need to update adopted acts.52
The benchmark—the objectives of the SSM
What becomes clear from this brief overview is that the SSM Regulation, taken in 
conjunction with the Interinstitutional Agreement, introduces a relatively detailed 
framework governing the provision of information by the ECB to, and its relation-
ship with, the EP. Yet, as was argued in the previous section, whether institutional 
contacts and information provided can become the basis of meaningful account-
ability depends on the existence of a clear set of objectives or standards based on 
which the action of the accountee can be assessed. Article 20 of the SSM Regulation 
on the accountability of the ECB does not itself specify the object of this account-
ability, beyond referring in rather broad terms to “the implementation of this 
Regulation” and “the execution of its supervisory tasks”.53 Moreover, an unequivo-
cal objective cannot be found elsewhere in the SSM Regulation. In fact, the SSM 
Regulation very much underscores the observation made in the previous section 
concerning the characteristics of financial market regulation and supervision. It 
includes multiple, vague objectives, without establishing a clear hierarchical order 
between them. More specifically, the first paragraph of art.1 of 6  the SSM Regula-
tion states that the objectives of the conferral of specific tasks relating to the pru-
dential supervision of credit institutions are,
51. Interinstitutional Agreement s.I.4, p.4.
52. Interinstitutional Agreement s.V, p.6.
53. SSM Regulation art.20(1) and (5).
14 Erasmus School of Law
ESL
“contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability 
of the financial system within the Union and each Member State, with full regard 
and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal 
treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage.”
To the extent that the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability 
of the financial system may be qualified as the core objectives of the ECB as a Euro-
pean supervisor,54 they hardly amount to a quantifiable yardstick based on which 
the performance of the ECB can be objectively evaluated. It is furthermore unclear, 
as will be highlighted later, what is required to achieve these objectives. In this 
*E.L. Rev. 12 connection, a bank failure may be deemed to constitute a supervisory 
failure, or may instead be regarded as inevitable and/or a necessary part of secur-
ing “the stability of the financial system”. In comparison, the ECB’s objectives for 
its monetary policy function are somewhat better defined in practice.55 The ECB’s 
primary objective is to maintain price stability.56 As a secondary, subordinated ob-
jective the ECB is to,
“support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing 
to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the 
Treaty on European Union.”57
Primary Union law does not offer a definition of the overriding, primary monetary 
policy objective, thus providing the ECB not only with instrument but also goal in-
dependence.58 However, the ECB’s Governing Council itself has announced its defi-
nition of price stability, stating that “it aims to maintain inflation rates below, but 
close to, 2% over the medium term”, acknowledging that this “makes the monetary 
policy more transparent” and “provides a clear and measurable yardstick against 
which the European citizens can hold the ECB accountable”.59
No such quantified objective providing for an easily measurable yardstick 
exists in the case of SSM banking supervision. ECB itself has defined financial 
54. On financial stability, see generally G. Lo Schiavo, The Role of Financial Stability in EU Law and Policy 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2017). On the duty of care for the unity and integrity of the in-
ternal market, see P. Schammo, “The European Central Bank’s Duty of Care for the Unity and Integrity 
of the Internal Market” (2017) 42 E.L. Rev. 3.
55. For a different view see D. Fromage and R. Ibrido, “The ‘Banking Dialogue’ as a Model to Improve Par-
liamentary Involvement in the Monetary Dialogue?” (2018) 40 Journal of European Integration 295, 
307 who argue that “while the Monetary Dialogue concerns an area in which the ECB’s mission is not 
precisely defined, its tasks as banking supervisor are easier to trace and hence to control for MEPs”.
56. Article 127(1) TFEU.
57. Article 127(1) TFEU.
58. Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks (1999), pp.359–360.
59. See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.html [Accessed 28 No-
vember 2018].
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stability as “a state whereby the build-up of systemic risk is prevented”.60 In turn, 
according to the ECB:
“Systemic risk can best be described as the risk that the provision of necessary fi-
nancial products and services by the financial system will be impaired to a point 
where economic growth and welfare may be materially affected.”61
While any attempt to quantify the objectives of the SSM must be applauded, in 
doing so the ECB is effectively replacing one vague yardstick with another, as it 
may be up to debate at what point economic growth and welfare are “materially 
affected”. The ECB is mandated to ensure the stability of the financial system not 
only within the Union, but also within each Member State.62 Yet, a clear, explicit 
hierarchy between these two not necessarily congruent objectives, similar to that 
found for the monetary policy objectives, is missing. Financial stability in the Union 
may, for example, demand that a credit institution is wound up, with considerable 
repercussions for the financial system of the Member State concerned. What is 
more, the other core objective of the SSM—that of ensuring “the safety and sound-
ness of credit institutions”63 —is also too ambiguous to serve as a sufficiently clear 
benchmark, and the relationship between this and the other objectives is unclear.
Not only are the SSM’s objectives broad and vague, but it is also hard to moni-
tor whether they are achieved in practice. This is because, as the European Court 
of Auditors notes: “A formal performance framework has not yet been developed 
to provide assurance about the achievement of the SSM objectives.”64 The Court of 
Auditors further notes that: *E.L. Rev. 13
“[The ECB] has produced a tool, the SSM Supervisory Dashboard Pilot, which allows 
it to track and assess the most important aspects of its supervisory activities and 
to monitor the effectiveness with which supervisory priorities are translated into 
practice. However, this tool is available only to the Supervisory Board and to senior 
management, and thus does not provide assurance to other stakeholders about the 
achievement of the SSM objectives.”65
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the ECB should create a public version 
of the SSM Supervisory Dashboard Pilot. This would, according to the argument, 
enable outside stakeholders to assess the extent to which the ECB achieves its 
60. See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html [Accessed 28 November 2017].
61. See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html [Accessed 28 November 2017].
62. SSM Regulation art.1.
63. SSM Regulation art.1.
64. European Court of Auditors, “Single Supervisory Mechanism—Good Start but Further Improve-
ments Needed”, Special Report No.29 (2016), p.46, https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.
aspx?did=39744 [Accessed 28 November 2018].
65. European Court of Auditors, “Single Supervisory Mechanism” (2016), p.46, https://www.eca.europa.
eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=39744 [Accessed 28 November 2018].
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objectives as a bank supervisor.66 In this connection, the European Court of Audi-
tors has further provided examples of formal performance indicators (and related 
metrics), which are commonly used in other jurisdictions and could therefore form 
part of such a framework, such as: indicators related to bankruptcies or the level of 
losses caused by defaults; 7  indicators related to (public) confidence in the bank-
ing sector or the banking supervisor; indicators of movement between different 
supervisory regimes or risk scores; and indicators based on stakeholder surveys.67 
A comprehensive, publicly available tool would greatly increase the capacity of the 
ECB’s accountability holders, as well as of the general public and various interest 
groups, to assess its performance as bank supervisor.
The European Parliament’s accountability instruments
Owing to the nature of the legal basis of the SSM, it is in principle possible to 
change the legal framework of the SSM by means of an amendment of second-
ary Union law. This stands in sharp contrast to the “quasi-constitutional status” of 
the legal and institutional arrangements on monetary policy, which are enshrined 
in EU primary law and hence are much more difficult to amend.68 Yet, as the SSM 
Regulation was adopted pursuant to art.127(6) TFEU, a special legislative procedure 
applies which puts the Council at the helm of the process, with the EP only having 
a right to be consulted.699 In fact, in procedural terms the ECB is put on an equal 
footing with the EP, as it too has the right to be consulted. Since the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure is not applicable, the possibility of amending the SSM Regulation 
cannot therefore be considered an instrument at the disposal of the EP. To be sure, 
any amendment of the SSM Regulation by the Council has to take place within the 
parameters of the EU Treaties and the relevant international standards.70
Compared with the procedure for the amendment of the SSM Regulation, the 
role of the EP in the appointment and dismissal of the management of the Super-
visory Board is somewhat more substantial, not least as a result of amendments 
introduced to the original Commission proposal for the SSM Regulation.71 First, 
66. B. Braun, “Two Sides of the Same Coin? Independence and Accountability of the European Central 
Bank” (Transparency International EU, 2017), p.48, transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/
TI-EU_ECB_Report_DIGITAL.pdf [Accessed 12 December 2018].
67. European Court of Auditors, “Single Supervisory Mechanism” (2016), p.47.
68. F. Amtenbrink and K. van Duin, “The European Central Bank before the European Parliament: Theory 
and Practice after Ten Years of Monetary Dialogue” (2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 561, 582–583; F. Amtenbrink, 
“The Metamorphosis of European Economic and Monetary Union” in D. Chalmers and A. Arnull (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) p.729; De Haan 
and Gormley, “The Democratic Deficit of the European Central Bank” (1996) 21 E.L. Rev. 95, 101.
69. Article 127(6) TFEU.
70. Louis, “Democracy and the European Central Bank” in Democracy in the New Economic Governance of 
the European Union (2015), pp.137–138.
71. ECON Committee, Report on the Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on the 
European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institu-
tions, COM(2012)0511 – C7-0314/2012 – 2012/0242(CNS), on ex art.19(2) Commission Proposal. For 
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while the chair and vice-chair are formally appointed by the Council by means of 
an *E.L. Rev. 14 implementing decision, whereby the vice-chair has to be chosen 
from among the members of the ECB’s Executive Board, this requires the approval 
of the EP.72 To this end, the Interinstitutional Agreement states that the ECB must 
provide Parliament with a shortlist of candidates for these two positions. The ECON 
Committee may submit questions to the ECB relating to the selection criteria and 
the shortlist of candidates. The ECB must then submit its proposals for the chair and 
the vice-chair to Parliament, together with written explanations of the underlying 
reasons. A public hearing of the proposed chair and vice-chair of the Supervisory 
Board is held in the ECON Committee. The Parliament must reach its final decision 
through a vote in the ECON Committee and in plenary. If the ECB’s proposal is not 
approved by the EP, the ECB may decide either to draw on the pool of candidates 
that applied originally for the position or to re-initiate the selection process.73
This involvement of the EP stands in sharp contrast to what can be observed for 
the appointment of the main managerial board of the ECB. It will be recalled that 
the EP is merely consulted on the appointment of the president, the vice-president 
and the other members of the executive board of the ECB.74 It is thus little surpris-
ing that the EP considers the arrangements in the SSM Regulation “an important 
precedent for an enhanced role of the EP in an EMU governance based on differen-
tiation”, and calls,
“for the inclusion of Parliament in the appointment procedure of the President, 
Vice-President and other members of the Executive Board of the ECB in Article 283 
TFEU, by requiring that it consents to the recommendations of the Council”.75
This proposal is reminiscent of the arrangements governing the Fed, whereby any 
appointment to the Board of Governors by the US President has to be confirmed by 
the US Senate.76 The implementation of this proposal would, however, require an 
amendment of primary Union law. A substantial role for the EP in the appointment 
of the members of the executive board would also be a recognition of the fact that 
its members form an integral part of the ECB’s Governing Council, which pursuant 
the amendments proposed by the EP, see, further, M. Markakis, “Political and Legal Accountability in 
Economic and Monetary Union” (Dissertation, Oxford University, 2017), Ch.5.
72. SSM Regulation art.26(3).
73. Interinstitutional Agreement s.II, pp.4–5.
74. TFEU, second subpara. of art.283(2).
75. Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Report on Constitutional Problems of a Multitier Governance in 
the European Union, 2012/2078(INI) (15 November 2013), paras 40 and 75, www.europarl.europa.
eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0372+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [Accessed 
28 November 2018].
76. G. Claeys, M. Hallerberg and O. Tschekassin, “European Central Bank Accountability: How the Monetary 
Dialogue Could Evolve”, Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue No.04 (2014), p.5.
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to the SSM Regulation formally adopts (or objects to) supervisory decisions that are 
prepared by the Supervisory Board.77
Secondly, the EP’s approval is required for the removal of the chair or vice-chair 
of the Supervisory Board from office.78 The ECB must submit any proposal to remove 
the chair or the vice-chair from office to Parliament and provide explanations.79 The 
approval process again requires a vote in the ECON Committee and in plenary.80 
The chair or vice-chair is formally removed from office by the Council by means 
of an implementing decision.81 This process is different from the one of removing 
members of the ECB’s Executive Board. If a member of the Executive Board no lon-
ger fulfils the conditions required for the performance of her/his duties, or if s/he 
has been guilty of serious 8  misconduct, the Court of Justice *E.L. Rev. 15 may, on 
application by the ECB’s Governing Council or Executive Board, compulsorily retire 
her/him.82 There is no formal parliamentary involvement in that process.
More specifically, the SSM Regulation provides that the chair and vice-chair can 
only be removed from office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the 
performance of their duties or have been guilty of serious misconduct.83 This brings 
the SSM Regulation into line with the primary law provisions on Executive Board 
members and governors of national central banks.84 It is further provided that the 
SSM’s vice-chair, who is chosen from among the members of the ECB’s Executive 
Board,85 may be removed from the Supervisory Board following her/his compulsory 
retirement from the Executive Board.86 The EP (or the Council) may inform the ECB 
that it considers the conditions for the removal of the chair or the vice-chair from 
office to be fulfilled.87 The ECB must provide its considerations in writing.88 What be-
comes clear from this provision is that the dismissal procedure cannot in principle 
be used by the EP (or the Council, for that matter) as an accountability instrument 
to assign consequences to bad performance. It may only be used in “extreme” situa-
tions, namely when the chair or vice-chair no longer fulfils the conditions required 
for the performance of her/his duties or has been guilty of serious misconduct.
Concerning the financing of the SSM-related activities of the ECB, it will be re-
called first of all that the budget of the ECB does not form part of the general budget 
of the EU. As such, it is not part of the decision on the annual budget pursuant 
77. SSM Regulation art.26(8).
78. SSM Regulation art.26(4).
79. Interinstitutional Agreement s.II, p.5.
80. Interinstitutional Agreement s.II, p.5.
81. SSM Regulation art.26(4).
82. Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB art.11.4.
83. SSM Regulation art.26(4) first subparagraph.
84. Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB arts 11.4 and 14.2 second paragraph.
85. SSM Regulation art.26(3) first subparagraph.
86. SSM Regulation art.26(4) second subparagraph.
87. SSM Regulation art.26(4) third subparagraph.
88. Interinstitutional Agreement s.II, p.5.
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to art.314 TFEU, which the EP takes jointly with the Council. Pursuant to art.26(2) 
Statute ESCB and ECB, it is the Executive Board of the ECB that draws up the annual 
accounts that have to be approved by the Governing Council. The ECB finances it-
self through own revenues and is only to a limited extent subject to scrutiny by the 
European Court of Auditors, as art.27.2. Statute ESCB and ECB limits the role of the 
latter institution to an examination of the “operational efficiency of the manage-
ment of the ECB”.89 This approach can be explained by the resolute of the drafters 
of the legal framework to ensure the (financial) independence of the ECB for its 
monetary policy tasks.
With regard to the ECB’s role in the SSM, the SSM Regulation provides that:
“The ECB shall be responsible for devoting the necessary financial and human re-
sources to the exercise of the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation.”90
To this purpose, it levies an annual supervisory fee on credit institutions and 
branches established in participating Member States, which must cover ex-
penditure incurred by the ECB in relation to the tasks conferred on it under arts 
4 –6 SSM Regulation91:
“The ECB’s expenditure for carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation 
shall be separately identifiable within the budget of the ECB.”92
Moreover, the SSM Regulation provides that:
“The ECB shall, as part of the [annual] report referred to in Article 20, report in detail 
on the budget for its supervisory tasks. The annual accounts of the ECB drawn up and 
published in accordance *E.L. Rev. 16 with Article 26.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and 
of the ECB shall include the income and expenses related to the supervisory tasks.”93
That the SSM-related budget is thus considered to be part of the general budget 
of the ECB also derives from art.29(2) SSM Regulation, according to which, in line 
with art.27.1 Statute ESCB and ECB, the supervisory section of the annual accounts 
shall be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing 
Council and approved by the Council.94 The role of the Court of Auditors is again 
limited to examining the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB, 
89. With regard to the monetary policy tasks of the ECB, see R. Smits, The European Central Banks: Insti-
tutional Aspects (The Hague and London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p.168.
90. SSM Regulation art.28.
91. SSM Regulation art.30(1).
92. SSM Regulation art.29(1).
93. SSM Regulation art.29(2).
94. SSM Regulation art.29(3).
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and the exact scope of this role has been the subject of heated debate between 
the two institutions.95
InITIAL EvIdEnCE froM PArLIAMEnTAry PrACTICE
In observing parliamentary practice to date, this contribution focuses on two main 
aspects that deserve consideration, namely the internal organisation in the ECON 
Committee and the actual course of events during the encounters with ECB officials.
Organisational aspects
9  As regards the internal organisation of the EP, in preparation for the coming into 
operation of the SSM, the so-called Banking Union Working Group (BUWG) was set 
up in October 2014, which is composed of 15 MEPs from the ECON Committee. It 
comprises the Committee’s chair and four vice-chairs, as well as MEPs from the 
eight political groups currently represented in the European Parliament. According 
to the publicly available documentation by the EP, the BUWG,
“monitors the implementation of the SSM, scrutinizes the exercise of the ECB’s 
tasks as bank supervisor and deals with any related matters concerning the SSM”.96
While little additional information is publicly available on the internal workings of 
the BUWG, from queries by the authors of this contribution it can be assumed that 
the role of BUWG is primarily that of an agenda-setter for the scrutiny of the ECB, 
inter alia for its supervision-related tasks. This goes beyond a mere preparation 
of the regular hearings, as the Group has its own working programme and meets 
more often than twice a year, which is the frequency rate of the regular hearings at 
ECON. It is also the BUWG that decides on the topics to be covered in briefing papers 
by external experts for the ECON Committee in preparation of the exchanges with 
the ECB. These external experts are contracted by the ECON Committee, namely 
the Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) of the EP’s Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies, for the duration of the legislative term. Similarly to what can be 
observed in the context of the monetary dialogue,97 these briefing papers take the 
form of an in-depth analysis of specific issues. In the case of the SSM, this includes 
95. See European Court of Auditors, “Single Supervisory Mechanism” (2016). European Court of Auditors, 
“European Central Bank Must Allow Full Scrutiny of Banking Supervision, Say Auditors” (14 January 
2019), https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/INPL19_ECB/INPL19_ECB_EN.pdf [Ac-
cessed 22 January 2019].
96. See www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/121342/Banking%20Union%20Working%20Group%20
20170614.pdf [Accessed 28 November 2017]. The BUWG also monitors the implementation of the 
SRM.
97. On the role of the panel of monetary and economic experts in the monetary dialogue, see Amten-
brink and Van Duin, “The European Central Bank before the European Parliament” (2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 
561, 579–581; S. Eijffinger, “Monetary Dialogue 2009–2014: Looking Backward, Looking Forward” 
(2015) Kredit und Kapital 1.
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items such as bank structural reform, conduct risk and internal rating models. 
Interestingly, on the website of the ECON Committee no specific information on 
the composition and selection procedure of this expert group could be found, and 
its composition can only be divined by *E.L. Rev. 17 glancing at the authors of the 
expert studies that are made available on the website. This opaqueness surround-
ing the external experts is quite remarkable considering that the EP regards these 
briefing papers to “form part of the scrutiny of the Banking Union”.98
Next to the external briefing papers, EGOV also issues its own briefing papers 
in preparation for the regular hearings and ad hoc exchanges with the ECB. These 
internal briefings analyse issues based on publicly available information and, ac-
cording to the EP, are made available for information purposes only. An illustra-
tion thereof is the briefing paper for the meeting of 19 June 2017 which focused 
on the resolution of Banco Popular, including inter alia a timeline of events and 
reflections on previous supervisory assessments; supervisory expectations for the 
relocation of banks to the euro area after Brexit; supervisory banking statistics 
on profitability, non-performing loans, and so on; and recent SSM publications.99 
Moreover, the internal briefing paper typically includes a summary (or an abstract) 
of the external briefing papers. In case there are more than one external briefing 
papers for a meeting, there can also be a separate note (or a “summary”) consolidat-
ing the summaries of those external briefing papers. For example, before the ECB 
took on its new banking supervision tasks, it carried out a financial health check of 
all banks to be supervised, consisting of an asset quality review and a stress test. 
Given the importance of those preparations, the ECON Committee commissioned 
two experts to assess the “Robustness, Validity and Significance of the ECB’s Asset 
Quality Review and Stress Test Exercise”, and the key findings of their studies were 
then outlined in a two-page note. 100 One last aspect regarding the ECON scrutiny of 
the SSM is, according to the information received by the authors, the existence of a 
secure reading room where MEPs can consult confidential documents such as the 
reports of the SSM boards, supervisory reports, and so on.
98. See www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602070/IPOL_BRI(2017)602070_EN.pdf 
[Accessed 28 November 2018].
99. See www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602087/IPOL_BRI(2017)602087_EN.pdf 
[Accessed 28 November 2018].
100. See www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/528764/IPOL_ATA(2014)528764_EN.pdf 
[Accessed 28 November 2018].
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oBSErvATIonS froM ThE rEguLAr hEArIngS And 
Ad hoC ExChAngES
The structure of the hearings
Turning to the actual encounters between the ECON Committee and ECB officials, 
we examined 13 hearings. These include nine ordinary public hearings and four 
presentations of the SSM’s annual report.101 In contrast to what can be observed for 
the monetary dialogue, for the time being no transcripts of these meetings are (pub-
licly) available on the ECON Committee’s website. What are instead accessible from 
the online multimedia library of the EP are video recordings.102 We cross-checked 
these recordings with the written transcripts from the chair’s speeches which are 
available on the SSM’s website, in order to ensure that no meetings where Ms Nouy 
was present were left out of the scope of this contribution. *E.L. Rev. 18 103
These hearings follow a set pattern. They commence with an introduction given 
by the chair of the ECON Committee (who is also a member of the BUWG), clarifying 
what type of meeting this is 10  (ordinary public hearing, ad hoc exchange of views, 
and so on), welcoming the chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board to the Committee, 
and explaining how the meeting will proceed. This is followed by an introductory 
statement from the chair of the Supervisory Board, and a Q & A session between 
the MEPs and the chair of the Supervisory Board. About 25 questions are asked by 
the MEPs during each hearing. Overall, a hearing will last for about 90 minutes.
The types of questions
What emerges from an initial analysis of the Q & A session is that questions can 
be placed into different categories. First, there are questions which arguably clearly 
focus on (the duties of) the SSM. Here, a whole range of issues are discussed, con-
cerning bank supervision, non-performing exposures (notably, non-performing 
loans), capital requirements, stress tests, the Basel rules, accounting standards, 
proposed EU rules whose adoption is still pending, and the completion of the Bank-
ing Union’s architecture. Moreover, the institutional interaction between the SSM, 
the European Banking Authority (EBA), the monetary policy function of the ECB 
and the NCAs is also the subject of debate. What is further notable is that many 
questions relate to the situation of specific credit institutions (mostly those that 
101. These are the meetings of 19 June 2018, 26 March 2018, 9 November 2017, 19 June 2017, 23 March 
2017, 9 November 2016, 13 June 2016, 22 March 2016, 19 October 2015, 25 June 2015, 31 March 2015, 
3 November 2014, 18 March 2014.
102. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/banking-union.html?tab=Banking%20
Supervision [Accessed 28 August 2017]. It should be stressed that the video recording from the ad 
hoc exchange of views that took place on 4 February 2014 was not available to watch, and we have 
not been able to solve the problem through our contacts with the EP.
103. See https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/speaker/chair/html/index.
en.html [Accessed 28 November 2018].
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have run into difficulties for various reasons). It can be observed that in many, al-
beit certainly not in all, instances the MEPs focus on issues that are of interest to 
the banking sector of the country where they come from. A notable example in 
this regard is when Irish MEPs ask questions concerning the health of individual 
banks in Ireland.104 The significance of this observation lies in the fact that MEPs do 
not, in principle, represent national constituencies, but rather the Union citizens.105 
In instances where questions concern specific cases of supervised credit institu-
tions, the chair of the Supervisory Board regularly invokes her confidentiality ob-
ligations under EU banking legislation and answers the question in a somewhat 
more general fashion.106
A second category of questions that can be observed from the hearings are 
those that concern issues that clearly fall outside the remit of the SSM. Notwith-
standing (and perhaps partly because of) the complex division of tasks between the 
national and EU Institutions, bodies and agencies acting in this area, the MEPs do 
not sharply distinguish between bank supervision, banking resolution, and indeed 
monetary policy issues. This is interesting, especially because of the emphasis that 
was put on the organisational separation between the monetary policy function 
and the supervisory tasks of the ECB when the SSM was created.107 While the major-
ity of questions indeed concern bank supervision, there are also questions on vari-
ous other issues concerning, inter alia, bank resolution, monetary policy, state aid 
to banks, or consumer protection. While some questions overtly concern issues that 
fall outside the remit of the SSM, other questions touch upon issues falling outside 
the SSM’s sphere of competence but are posed in a way that brings them within 
the SSM’s remit. To provide an example of the latter type of question, the MEPs 
sometimes address issues relating to, say, monetary policy (e.g. the level of interest 
rates) from a supervisory perspective: what are the consequences of a low-interest 
rate environment for bank profitability and what is the chair’s assessment of the 
situation? 108 Another example is the connection between decreasing profitability 
of banks and fin tech (the latter also falling outside the SSM’s remit). *E.L. Rev. 19 109
A third, distinct, category comprises questions that touch upon cross-cutting 
issues that do not only fall within the remit of one institution, agency or body, 
such as where a bank was put into resolution, and there were also questions about 
money laundering, or questions about whether low interest rates are having an 
impact on the profitability of banks.110 There are two sub-categories of such ques-
104. See, e.g., the meeting of 3 November 2014.
105. Articles 14(2) and 10 TEU.
106. Some typical examples of the words used by the chair are: “but to respond in a general fashion …”; 
“again, without entering into confidential information …” (Meeting of 19 October 2015).
107. We are grateful to René Smits for this valuable observation. See SSM Regulation art.25.
108. See, e.g., the meeting of 23 March 2017.
109. See, e.g., the meeting of 19 October 2015.
110. See, e.g., the meeting of 23 March 2017.
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tions or issues. In some cases, these issues concern both the tasks conferred upon 
the ECB’s Supervisory Board and those given to another EU agency/body, such as 
in the case of a credit institution that is put into resolution, whereby questions 
are raised about the supervisor’s role in preventing the failure of the bank.111 This 
would have also been a matter for the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which is a 
separate Union agency. In other cases, questions may concern the exercise of the 
duties of the Supervisory Board and the national authorities concerned, such as 
in the case of a bank which was recapitalised and there were also problems with 
money laundering. Money laundering can be a sign of poor risk management and 
internal control.112 What can be observed is that the chair of the Supervisory Board 
commonly refers to the limits of her mandate, and retorts that this is a question for 
the national justice concerned (in the case of money laundering), the SRB (in the 
case of bank resolution), or the monetary policy function of the ECB (with respect 
to interest rates), and so on.
From the standpoint of accountability, this practice raises the interesting ques-
tion of what the appropriate forum then is for discussions on such cross-cutting 
issues with the relevant institutions, bodies or agencies—at least for those issues 
that are closely linked, such as supervision and resolution. This is all the more 
challenging whenever a question concerns different branches of 11  government 
(e.g. the judiciary and the executive) located at different levels of this system of 
governance (national and EU level). Questions that need an answer in this context 
are whether there are issues that therefore “slip through the cracks”; and what the 
implications are for institutional design in this area. It has been suggested that it is 
the responsibility of the MEP concerned to bring the issue up again in the relevant 
hearing; and that, with respect to written questions, Mr Draghi may for example, 
depending on the question, suggest that it would be better for Ms Nouy to reply 
instead. 113 Moreover, how would these problems be addressed (if at all) if there 
were to be a single European capital markets supervisor, as envisaged in the Five 
Presidents’ Report114 and the Commission’s reflection paper on the future of EMU?115
Though not strictly speaking falling within the category of hearings that this 
article is looking at, it may be observed that there are interparliamentary commit-
tee meetings taking place at the EP which may provide a forum for discussion of 
such cross-cutting issues. These meetings bring together both MEPs and national 
111. See, e.g., the meeting of 19 June 2017.
112. See the meeting of 19 June 2017.
113. We are grateful to Johannes Lindner for this observation.
114. J.-C. Juncker in close co-operation with D. Tusk, J. Dijsselbloem, M. Draghi and M. Schulz, “Completing 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union” (22 June 2015), p.12, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf [Accessed 22 October 2018].
115. European Commission, “Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union” 
COM(2017) 291, p.20, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-
emu_en.pdf [Accessed 28 November 2018].
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parliamentarians (also from outside the Banking Union). In the meeting of 16 
February 2016, for example, both Ms Nouy (chair of the SSM’s Supervisory Board) 
and Ms König (chair of the SRB) were present. European and national parliamentar-
ians were given the opportunity to make short statements/comments and to ask 
questions to them. Thereafter, Ms Nouy and Ms König gave some comments (albeit 
rather briefly). Apart from providing the MEPs and members of national parlia-
ments with an opportunity to address issues that touch upon the duties of both the 
SSM and the SRM, such meetings also give the opportunity to the chairs of the EU 
Institutions concerned to appeal to MEPs and national parliamentarians *E.L. Rev. 
20 to help them fulfil their mission.116 This is crucial in cases of “de novo” or “mixed” 
administration, where the EU Institutions/agencies work with and through the 
Member State administrations, and highlights in our opinion the need also for the 
SSM/SRM to be able to address both the EP and NPs.117
A first assessment of these hearings
Notwithstanding the questions that concern issues (partly or fully) falling outside 
the SSM’s remit, a qualitative assessment of these hearings allows the conclusion 
that overall the MEPs raise informed questions that show an understanding of the 
relevant issues. Moreover, an interesting feature of those hearings is that the MEPs 
follow up on questions asked by their colleagues when these were not answered 
to their satisfaction. It is also common in those meetings for the chair of the ECON 
Committee to briefly comment (in one to two sentences) on the answer given by 
the chair of the Supervisory Board, right after it is given, in order to indicate his dis-
agreement with her assessment of the relevant issues. Furthermore, the members 
of the Committee sometimes repeat their question if they deem that it was not 
(adequately) answered by the chair of the Supervisory Board in her reply.
While it can be observed that the “atmosphere” in those meetings was, gener-
ally speaking, very polite and civil, the mood notably deteriorated whenever the 
MEPs sensed a failure of the SSM, such as whenever a bank had run into difficul-
ties and a meeting was held shortly afterwards, or whenever a bank had been 
preventatively recapitalised. Two prominent examples are the recapitalisation of 
Portuguese and Italian banks, as well as the resolution of Banco Popular.118 Such 
events are evidently deemed by (at least some) MEPs to indicate a failure of the 
116. More specifically, Ms Nouy commented that: “The SSM was created by the Union legislators with a 
mission to pursue, and we are doing our best to accomplish it. There are, however, limits to what we 
can do on our own and we will need your help, the legislators, both at European and national level, to 
achieve truly single supervision. We need to work together to reduce existing fragmentation and we 
need to be vigilant on draft legislation, both at national and Union level, to ensure that prudential 
rules for banks are fully harmonised, to accomplish the mission that you have entrusted us with.”
117. On the visits by Mr Draghi to NPs, see T. Tesche, “Instrumentalizing EMU’s Democratic Deficit: The 
ECB’s Unconventional Accountability Measures during the Eurozone Crisis”, Journal of European 
Integration (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1513498 [Accessed 28 November 2018].
118. See the meeting of 19 June 2017.
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SSM. In this connection, it should be noted that even a “failure” in this sense is not 
always regarded as a failure of the European supervisor by the chair of the Super-
visory Board. By the same token, the resolution of the bank was “modestly” seen 
as a success.119 This complicates the assessment of the SSM’s performance by its 
accountability holders.
Other, more “critical”, questions asked by MEPs concern the issue of equal treat-
ment of banks across Member States (clearly a very sensitive topic). Questions in 
this direction can be linked to the broad objective stated in the SSM Regulation, 
notably the duty of the ECB to have,
“full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based 
on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory ar-
bitrage.”
The efficiency of the SSM’s operations and the treatment of smaller banks have also 
been a focal point of those discussions (e.g. with respect to “burdensome” reporting 
obligations incumbent on those banks). On some occasions, MEPs use statements 
made by officials from (national or EU) institutions other than the ECB to raise an 
issue with the chair of the Supervisory Board.120 The chair of the Supervisory Board 
is also frequently asked to comment on the actions of the monetary policy func-
tion of the ECB—an issue clearly falling outside her mandate, which nevertheless 
touches upon bank profitability. *E.L. Rev. 21
12  Overall, the impression one gets from a first qualitative analysis of these 
hearings is that the MEPs do not (explicitly) ask questions on the achievement of 
the SSM’s objectives, but rather focus on the overall performance of the banking 
sector or the financial health of individual banks.121 Accordingly, the chair of the 
Supervisory Board is asked to give an assessment of the situation in the banking 
sector in the SSM countries or to give an account for the board’s action or inaction 
with respect to individual banks. The chair is further asked to comment on issues 
that fall squarely within her mandate (for example, non-performing loans),122 or 
issues that can have an impact on objectives falling within the board’s mandate 
(for example, a lack of investor and consumer protection can have an impact on 
financial stability).123 This makes for a rather contextual discussion, which does not 
sharply focus on whether the ECB has achieved its objectives as prudential supervi-
sor. To be sure, this might be an inevitable consequence of the young age of the SSM, 
which has only been operating for less than four years. It should further be noted 
that the MEPs are clearly very grateful for the work done by the SSM officials, and 
119. See the reply by the chair of the Supervisory Board to the follow-up question asked by the chairman 
in the meeting of 19 June 2017.
120. See, e.g., the meeting of 25 June 2015.
121. See, e.g., the meeting of 25 June 2015.
122. Among the very many examples, see, e.g., the meeting of 23 March 2017.
123. See the meeting of 22 March 2016.
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that they have repeatedly made that clear, especially in the very first hearings.124 Be 
that as it may, they can also be very critical of the performance of the SSM on other 
occasions, as noted above.
Moreover, considering the questions asked by the MEPs so far, there is no (ex-
plicit) dissatisfaction shared among them with the accountability arrangements 
for the SSM that are currently in force or with the role given to the EP in holding the 
Supervisory Board to account for the exercise of its duties. 125 This is not to say that 
there are no references to accountability or transparency. However, such terminol-
ogy seems to be used to bolster a substantive point made by MEPs or when more 
information is requested on a specific issue. On rather a few occasions, the MEPs 
have asked for (or recommended) the publication of reports by private entities126 
or lobbying letters127 or the impact assessment (if any) for the ECB’s Addendum on 
non-performing loans.128 On a related matter, there are a small number of ques-
tions on whether the chair of the SSM feels independent enough (from the ECB) to 
exercise her supervisory duties.129 It is no secret, and indeed it is hardly a surprise, 
that some MEPs do not seem to be satisfied with the institutional form that the Su-
pervisory Board took, i.e. as a body of the ECB, rather than as a separate institution.
As regards the use made of the internal and external briefing papers referred to 
in the beginning of this section, the MEPs mostly draw on issues discussed in the 
notes (or briefing papers) prepared by the EGOV in advance of the meetings of the 
ECON Committee. These are, largely speaking, the “issues of the day”, which makes 
for a rather contextual discussion. That being said, there are clearly many ques-
tions that do not specifically draw on the issues discussed in those internal briefing 
papers. Moreover, there are very few explicit references to the external briefing 
papers drawn up by experts in the questions asked by the MEPs. There are, how-
ever, a number of questions that touch upon the issues “flagged” in those papers. 
Clearly, a better use could have been made of those papers, in order to facilitate an 
informed discussion on the relevant issues. To be sure, this is not a problem that 
is specific to the ECON Committee’s interaction *E.L. Rev. 22 with the SSM. Previ-
ous research has identified this problem also with respect to the ECB’s monetary 
dialogue with the EP.130
124. See, e.g., the hearings of 18 March 2014 and 3 November 2014.
125. It is worth noting that in the beginning of the meeting of 22 March 2016, the President thanked 
the chair of the Supervisory Board “for the very open and transparent dialogue with the European 
Parliament”. For a rare exception, see the meeting of 18 March 2014 (concerning the frequency with 
which the record of the proceedings of the Supervisory Board is made available to Parliament).
126. See the meeting of 19 June 2017.
127. See the meeting of 22 March 2016.
128. See, e.g., the meeting of 26 March 2018.
129. See, e.g., the meeting of 25 June 2015.
130. Amtenbrink and Van Duin, “The European Central Bank before the European Parliament” (2009) 34 
E.L. Rev. 561, 579–581.
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Conclusions
The inclusion of explicit provisions on the accountability of the ECB for the conduct 
of its supervisory tasks in the framework of the SSM may be an acknowledgement 
of the difference in quality of the tasks of banking supervision from the conduct of 
monetary policy. In a broader sense, it may also be evidence for the evolving role of 
the EP in the monitoring of the performance of European Institutions and bodies 
in European monetary, economic and financial governance that has commenced 
with the initiation by the EP of the monetary dialogue, which has previously been 
extended to economic policy co-ordination in the European Semester.131
As the only directly elected Union institution, the EP is predestined to take cen-
tre stage in the accountability of a Union institution which—in exercising public 
power—has been deliberately positioned at arm’s length from other Union institu-
tions and bodies, as well as from national governments. Yet, the extent to which 
the EP can fulfil a meaningful role in this regard depends on several variables that 
are closely linked to the conceptualisation of the appropriate type and degree 
of accountability.
Leaving aside for the moment the pertinent question as to what extent the 
necessary preconditions are in place, the most blatant shortcoming of the current 
accountability relationship between the EP and the ECB is the absence of meaning-
ful instruments that would allow the EP to assign consequences to its judgment of 
the performance of the ECB. First, it has been noted that the EP 13  does not exercise 
budgetary control over the ECB and its SSM-related operations. Secondly, differently 
from what can be observed for the monetary policy tasks of the ECB, the legal basis 
of the SSM has not been insulated from amendments through constitutionalisa-
tion. Yet, whereas the legal basis of the SRM puts the EP on an equal footing with 
the Council in the legislative process through the application of the ordinary leg-
islative procedure,132 this is not the case for the SSM Regulation, which is based on 
art.127(6) TFEU. Considering the position of the EP in the European constitutional 
construct, it is difficult to justify why its formal rights in the legislative procedure 
establishing or amending the SSM do not even exceed those assigned to the ECB 
itself. Referring in this context to the independent position of the ECB is somewhat 
misplaced, as the role accorded to the Council under art.127(6) TFEU means that 
another Union political institution can amend the SSM Regulation.
Thirdly, though the EP does have a substantial role in the appointment and 
dismissal of the chair and vice-chair of the Supervisory Board, the function of 
this involvement as an accountability instrument is impaired by the fact that 
131. The latter refers to the economic dialogue inter alia referred to in Regulation 1466/97 on the strength-
ening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies [1997] OJ L209/1, as amended, art.2ab; Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [1997] OJ L209/6, as amended, art.2a.
132. Regulation 806/2014 is based on art.114 TFEU.
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performance-based dismissal is excluded. What is more, according to the applicable 
legal framework, supervisory decisions are formally attributed to the ECB’s Govern-
ing Council rather than its Supervisory Board. In this context, it has been argued in 
this contribution that, at least, the EP’s consent should be required for the appoint-
ment of the members of the ECB’s Executive Board (who also participate in the Gov-
erning Council). However, this would require an amendment of art.283(2) TFEU.
This rather sober assessment of the instruments at the disposal of the EP to 
hold the ECB to account for the exercise of its duties is all the more regrettable con-
sidering that it derives from the analysis offered in this contribution that the in-
formation requirements under the SSM Regulation and the Interinstitutional *E.L. 
Rev. 23 Agreement, coupled with the (internal organisation of the) regular hearings 
and ad hoc exchanges, in principle provide a robust basis for the EP to understand 
and evaluate policy decisions and their rationale and, more generally, to remove in-
formation asymmetries, also with regard to the public at large. This positive picture 
is somewhat mitigated by the relative vagueness of the SSM’s objective(s), as well 
as the parallel existence of other Union bodies and agencies which pursue partially 
overlapping objectives. It is further mitigated by the valid concerns expressed in 
the literature with respect to supervisory data transparency.133
As regards the actual practice of prudential supervision dialogues, the focus 
in this contribution has been on a—mostly—qualitative assessment of the public 
hearings at the EP. There is cause for concern that there may be issues related to 
the Banking Union or monetary policy that “slip through the cracks”, in the sense 
that they are not addressed to the right person during those hearings and then 
the point may be lost before the next relevant hearing. From a theoretical stand-
point, the concern is that “the ‘police patrols’ will generally occur in isolation”,134 
which means in this context that the ECB president, the chair of the Supervisory 
Board, the chair of the SRB, and other heads of agencies (such as EBA) will be held 
separately to account for the performance of their duties. The setting-up of a single 
European capital markets supervisor may or may not simplify the accountability 
framework in this respect and would, in any event, most likely entail a substantial 
role for the competent national authorities, which would again be held to account 
separately from one another.135
A related concern relates to cross-cutting issues addressed by the MEPs in those 
hearings that fall within the mandate of multiple EU Institutions, bodies and agen-
cies. In the most problematic of those cases from an accountability perspective, the 
Institutions concerned are also situated at different levels of government (national 
133. C. Gandrud and M. Hallerberg, “Does Banking Union Worsen the EU’s Democratic Deficit? The Need 
for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency” (2015) 53 J.C.M.S. 769.
134. Gandrud and Hallerberg, “Does Banking Union Worsen the EU’s Democratic Deficit?” (2015) 53 
J.C.M.S. 769, 773.
135. For the NCAs in the Banking Union, see Gandrud and Hallerberg, “Does Banking Union Worsen the 
EU’s Democratic Deficit?” (2015) 53 J.C.M.S. 769, 773–774.
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and EU level). Interparliamentary co-operation (for example within the confines of 
the art.13 TSCG conference) may only alleviate and clearly cannot fully solve this 
problem.136 The key challenge is to synchronise the operation of such accountabil-
ity mechanisms, as well as to create information flows between the EP and the par-
liaments of the participating Member States. What is more, it will be recalled that 
the division of competence between and within the two levels of government is, in 
some cases, not crystal clear. This serves to exacerbate the concern outlined above.
Overall, it is presently submitted that the Banking Union has a long way to go 
in terms of accountability (and transparency). There is certainly scope for improve-
ment, but that would in some cases require a Treaty amendment, which may for 
the time being be politically unfeasible.
136. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20399/st00tscg26_en12.pdf [Accessed 28 November 2018]. See 
generally V. Kreilinger, “Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation and its Challenges: The Case of Economic 
and Financial Governance” in F. Fabbrini, E. Hirsch Ballin and H. Somsen (eds), What Form of Govern-
ment for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2015), Ch.15.
